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RECIPIENTS' RIGHTS UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT CODE
Arthur Larson*
RATHER THAN UNDERTAKE A POINT-BY-POINT CRITIQUE of the Draft Con-
vention on Investments Abroad, this comment will concentrate on one
major issue: the problem of balancing the rights of investors and recipients.
The principal flaw in the Draft Convention is its one-sidedness. In form
it is evenhanded. That is, at every point the rights it confers and the duties
it exacts apply identically to "each party." In the same way, as Anatole
France pointed out, the law forbids both the rich man and the poor man
to sleep in the park.
In substance, however, the entire concern of the Convention is the pro.
tection of the rights of the investor. There are no provisions motivated
by concern for the rights of the host country. The Draft Convention shares
this flaw with practically all the other draft conventions on the subject
that have been generally discussed.
There has been a notable exception to this one-sided approach, one
which has not had sufficient attention. This was the proposal by the Prime
Minister of Malaya made at a speech opening the meeting of the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East in Malaya on March 5, 1958. The
substance of his proposal has been accorded the support of a large number
of newly-developing countries in the United Nations. In his speech, the
Prime Minister first dealt with the need for governmental economic aid
and governmental development plans. He then went on to say:
But I doubt whether international government aid, vital
though it is, will ever be sufficient to meet all our needs. For this
reason I suggest that more consideration be given to the promo-
tion of the flow of private capital into Asian countries from more
advanced countries in other parts of the world. I am aware that
many countries represented here already attach importance to
creating the right conditions to attract such private capital and
that this subject has been discussed on many occasions spon-
sored by this Economic Commission. His Majesty's Govern-
ment here in this country has certainly always made its stand
clear on this subject, but I wonder whether we should not all
go further than these individual statements and purely national
measures.
I wonder whether it would not be a powerful incentive to the
attraction of private capital to Asia if those countries, which
decided as a matter of public policy that they wished to attract
such capital, were to come together through channels provided by
the United Nations economic organisations such as this, and were
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to draw up, in consultation with representatives of potential
lender countries, an International Charter by which they would
agree to regulate their treatment of foreign private capital. I will
not attempt to elaborate this morning the details of such a
Charter. As I see it, it would have the object of assuring poten-
tial lenders that their just rights and interests would be fully
respected tnd protected; it might also indicate to them the part
they would be expected to play in promoting the development
of both the human and natural resources in the receiving coun-
try; and last, but by no means least, it would remove any fears
that private foreign investment might interfere with the sover-
eignty and true national interests of the receiving country. Such
a Charter would, of course, be a purely voluntary one open to
signature by any country interested in promoting the interna-
tional flow of private capital. But I should hope that our neigh-
bouring countries in South East Asia in particular would be
willing to take a lead in this matter. For as I have said before:
we and our neighbours in South East Asia have so many com-
mon problems that if we are to progress we must work together
ever more closely-perhaps even through the aegis of some
special committee or working party established by this Com-
mission.
But if, as I believe to be the case, we need more capital both
public and private I cannot help but think that if some Charter
such as that which I have suggested could be drawn up, it would
constitute a powerful inducement to private enterprise in other
countries of the world to lend to those less developed countries
which they knew had publicly subscribed to it.1
A convention on international investment is obviously meaningless un-
less it is agreed to by the host country as well as the investing country.
It is therefore difficult to understand why so little attention has been given
to the desires and attitudes of the recipient countries, in spite of the prom-
ising lead provided by the Malayan Prime Minister. As one looks at the
present Draft Convention and the other draft proposals that have been
made, one cannot help wondering how they must appear from the point
of view of the capital-receiving countries. These drafts take great pains to
protect the interests of the investor against various kinds of expropriation
and discrimination, and buttress these protective devices by provisions on
enforcement which often have a faintly menacing tone. The provisions may
all be perfectly reasonable, but how do they appear to the newly develop-
ing countries? To them it may seem that the rich and strong nations of
the world are "ganging up" to protect their own self-interest and to im.
pose their will upon the smaller nations.
Thus, in the New York Times of April 23, 1959, it is reported that the
I A condensation of this address is found in U.N. Economic and Social Council Off.
Rec., 26th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 24 (Doc. No. E/3102) (1958).
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Pakistan delegate to the International Chamber of Commerce, in the
course of discussion of the Chamber's International Investment Code,
criticized private enterprise for laying too much emphasis on
profit and too little on social responsibilities, such as support
for education and health projects. 2
It is not the purpose of this comment to make specific proposals for
clauses in a draft convention addressed to the rights of the hdst country.
These proposals must emanate from the host countries themselves. What
the writer would like to propose (and has been proposing for some time
past) is a full-scale research project to find out exactly what the capital-
receiving countries believe they should have in the way of protection and
assurances in an international investment code. There have been some
general clues, but much more work has to be done to find out specifically
what they have in mind. Several broad themes keep recurring in their
comments. One of them is that any such code must concern itself with
the protection of the independence and sovereign rights of the recipient
country. Another recurring theme has to do with the right of any nation
to reserve control over its naturd.l resources in the interests of its own
people. Still another theme is the need for investors and investing coun-
tries to take a greater interest in the social and economic and human needs
of the people of the recipient country.
A thorough job of research on this topic, followed by the kind of con-
ference proposed by the Malayan Prime Minister, might well produce a
detailed and reliable set of proposals whose inclusion in an investment
convention would multiply its chances of general acceptance.
There are those who say that, while this is all perfectly true, the purpose
of an investment code is frankly to protect the investor, and that therefore
its one-sided character is justifiable. Whether this is so as a matter of
abstract logic is not the question. The question is whether the host coun-
tries agree with this one-sided approach, for if they do not, any conven-
tion, however unassailable its intrinsic excellence, will remain a futile
exercise in draftsmanship.
It may be that a leaf may be borrowed here, as in so many other inter-
national matters, from experience in labor negotiation and labor legisla-
tion. A skillfully drawn labor bill or contract will often go to great pains
to balance out a provision on employer rights and duties with a corre-
sponding provision on employee rights and duties, and vice versa, thus
preserving an impartial impression. One may recall here the vigorous
insistence by unions that the non-Communist affidavits for labor union
leaders in the National Labor Relations Act be balanced by a requirement
that all employers also take a non-Communist oath. The reason for this
2 N. Y. Times p. 9, col. 1 (April 23, 1959).
PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONVENTION
insistence was probably not that the unions seriously believed that com-
munism among American business executives was a problem requiring
legislative solution. Rather, the reason was that, until the provision relat-
ing to union officers was balanced by one relating to corporate officers,
the legislation contained a sort of implication which the labor movement
regarded as insulting and discriminatory. This is not to imply that the pro-
visions concerned with the interests of the host countries should be mean-
ingless, face-saving makeweights inserted solely for their antiphonal effect.
There will be many significant matters of substance in this category. At
the same time, the investing countries should realize that provisions which
may seem either insignificant or superfluous to them may seem important
to the host country. For example, the host country may want to include
assertions of sovereign rights which are self-evident and undisputed in
international law. If the recipient countries want such pronouncements
included for reasons of their own, it would be the height of ineptitude for
the investing countries to prejudice the acceptance of the convention by
raising objections on the ground of alleged redundancy.
The general point of view here suggested is not altogether without prec-
edent. In the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, for instance,
there was the following passage in Title IV of the Act for International
Development, in section 402(c):
In the case of investment this involves confidence on the part
of the people of the underdeveloped areas that investors will
conserve as well as develop local resources, will bear a fair share
of local taxes and observe local laws, and will provide adequate
wages and working conditions for local labor.3
In conclusion: the recommendation of this comment is that the efforts
now being applied to the problem of the protection of investment take a
new direction and a new emphasis. One cannot help being impressed by
the amount of energy that is being devoted to this problem, in the form
of formation of associations, drafting and discussion of possible treaties,
writing of books and articles, conduct of special research projects, and
holding of conferences. The suggestion here is that if a considerable frac-
tion of the resources and effort now devoted to this issue could be focused
upon understanding and effectuating the legitimate wishes of the recipient
countries, we might bring much nearer the day when we shall see a con-
vention on international investments which is both workable and accept-
able.
a 64 Stat. 204 (1950).
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INTERNATIONAL MEASURES FOR THE PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT*
Richard N. Gardnert
THE PRINCIPAL CHALLENGE to students of international law today, accord-
ing to a recent article by Professors Myres S. McDougal and Harold D.
Lasswell, is: "[to make] continuous reappraisal of the circumstances in
which specific institutional combinations can make the greatest... contri.
bution to our overarching [goals]." 1 I have been asked to take up this
challenge by reappraising existing and proposed international institutions
for the protection and promotion of private foreign investment.
This is quite a large exercise. Since the short time available does not
permit a comprehensive historical or analytical survey of the subject, I
shall make a highly personal evaluation in the form of six propositions.
Some of these propositions will undoubtedly prove controversial; but
they will serve at least to define the issues.
My six propositions are as follows:
1. A satisfactory rate of economic growth of the free world is an essential
precondition to the achievement of our basic objectives.
Our basic objectives may be defined in shorthand form as security,
prosperity, and freedom, both for ourselves and for the other peoples
of the non-Communist world. Currently the most dramatic way of demon.
strating the relation between these objectives and free world economic
growth is to emphasize the "Communist economic challenge." At the
Twenty-first Communist Party Congress in Moscow, Mr. Khrushchev
boasted that the world balance of economic power was turning in favor
of the Communists. He predicted that br 1970 the Soviet Union would
be outproducing the United States and that the Communist bloc would
be outproducing the free world. He concluded that Communist victory in
the production race would "attract millions of new adherents and bring
about tremendous changes not only in our own country, but in the whole
world."
Khrushchev's challenge is real and it is well for us to be concerned about
it. But surely we can state our interest in economic growth in a more
affirmative way. Even if the Communists were not around, we would
need to have a satisfactory rate of economic growth, not only for its own
sake, but also because it is a prerequisite to the attainment of our non-
* Reprinted from [19591 Proc. Am. Soc. Int. L. 255 with permission of the Society.
Professor Gardner's paper was written in 1959 and given as an address before the annual
meeting of the Society.
t Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School; author of Sterling-Dollar
Diplomacy (1956) and other works.
3 McDougal and Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 Am. J. Int. L. 1, 5 (1959).
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material ends. To be sure, economic development is not the panacea some
people have claimed it to be. But in a world swept by the "revolution of
rising expectations," it is clearly an essential basis for progress toward
security and freedom.2
2. Free world economic growth of the kind necessary to promote our
objectives is heavily dependent on foreign investment by the industrialized
West.
Economic development requires capital. For the underdeveloped coun-
tries, there are three possible sources of capital: domestic, Communist,
and Western. The relative emphasis which underdeveloped countries place
on these alternative sources will profoundly affect their economic and
political evolution and consequently our pursuit of security, prosperity,
and freedom.
A good part of the capital needs of the underdeveloped countries can
and must be supplied from domestic sources. But for most of these coun-
tries, existing production is barely sufficient to cover current consumption
needs. Only a small margin of production can be channeled into the for-
mation of capital. If these countries despair of obtaining sufficient capital
from abroad, they will be forced to adopt totalitarian measures at home.
They will seek development by ruthlessly suppressing consumption and
by forcibly mobilizing capital and labor. They may withdraw into militant,
embittered nationalism. For them, development will create a climate in
which freedom cannot survive. For us, it will mean the loss of vital raw
materials and markets, a vast erosion of our world power, and the end
of an opportunity to further the cause of human freedom.
The second source of capital for the underdeveloped countries is the
Communist world. The Communist leaders use trade and aid as political
weapons. Even though their assistance may be unaccompanied by formal
political conditions, the spread of their capital, technology, and man-
power throughout the underdeveloped countries cannot fail to have a
political effect.
We need not fear Communist investment in these countries as long as
it is relatively small in comparison with investment by the West. But
when the Communist bloc becomes the main source of foreign capital
for an underdeveloped country, it will use the influence thus gained to
detach the country from the free world. Should this strategy prove suc-
cessful in the case of some of the larger underdeveloped countries like
India and Indonesia, the Communists would profoundly alter in their
favor the balance of political and economic power. We cannot afford to
let this happen.
2 For more detailed argument in support of this and the following two propositions,
see Gardner, New Directions in U. S. Foreign Economic Policy (Foreign Policy Association
Headline Series, Booklet No. 133, 1959).
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The third and last source of capital is the industrialized West-pri-
marily the United States. This means that our investment represents the
only chance for the underdeveloped countries to achieve a tolerable rate
of economic development without sacrificing human values and without
joining the Communist bloc. Beyond this, our investment provides an
excellent channel-perhaps the only effective one-through which we can
influence the institutions of the underdeveloped countries and transmit to
them our most important human values.
3. The present flow of Western investment-private and public-is far
below the level necessary to promote the economic growth essential to the
achievement of our objectives.
More than two thirds of the free world's people live in the underde-
veloped countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
According to United Nations statistics, per capita income in these coun.
tries averages about $100 a year, compared with $2,000 in the United
States and $1,000 in other developed parts of the free world. The people
in these countries have a life expectancy of only thirty-six years, about
half as long as the life expectancy in the rest of the free world.
It is not sufficiently understood that the gap in living standards within
the free world is actually widening, not decreasing. In some of the less
developed countries, population growth is causing an absolute decline in
per capita income. In most others, whatever increase has taken place
has been far less than increases in per capita income in the industrialized
countries. This wide and growing gap in living standards is a time bomb
which ticks ominously beneath the surface of contemporary affairs.
The record of economic development in the free world is particularly
inadequate when compared with the record of the Communist bloc. We
have only to contrast the growth of India with the growth of China. In
1952, the steel production of these countries was approximately equal,
about one million tons. Today, Indian steel production is up to about
two million tons, while Communist China's steel production is over nine
million tons. This disparity in rates of growth cannot help but influence
the judgment of many leaders in underdeveloped countries concerning the
relative merits of the Communist and free systems for the solution of
their own problems.
The unsatisfactory rate of economic growth in the underdeveloped
countries of the free world may seem strange in view of the extent of
foreign investment by the industrialized West. The statistics for private
investment are particularly impressive, revealing in recent years an ex-
traordinary increase in foreign direct and portfolio investment by the
United States and a real revival in such investment by Western Europe.
The difficulty, of course, is that this investment is very unequally distrib-
uted among the countries of the free world.
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Although gaps and inconsistencies in the available data make it im-
possible to give precise figures, it is possible to give a rough idea of the
present pattern of capital flow. Figures available for the three years
1956-1958 indicate that United States private foreign investment is running
at about four billion dollars a year. This is a gross figure which includes
reinvestment by branches and subsidiaries abroad and does not deduct the
return flow of capital and earnings. Of this four billion, about two billion
dollars are being invested in the underdeveloped countries. Total foreign
investment by the rest of the industrialized West (primarily the United
Kingdom, France, West Germany, Canada, Switzerland, The Netherlands,
and Belgium) is running at an annual rate of about two billion dollars, of
which two thirds to three quarters of a billion are flowing to the under-
developed countries. But only about 200 million dollars of gross annual
United States private investment in underdeveloped countries are going to
the non-oil-producing countries of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Only
about 300 million dollars of the gross annual private investment of the
other Western industrial powers are going to these countries-and even
these 300 million dollars are mostly concentrated in their overseas com-
monwealths. To this meager 500 million dollar total, we should add
about 250 million dollars of additional private funds being invested in
these countries each year through the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development.3
To be sure, the economically advanced countries of the West have em-
barked on substantial programs of government investment overseas. But
these programs are also very unevenly distributed throughout the free
world. According to the United Nations, about two billion dollars a year of
public capital have been flowing to underdeveloped countries.4 This
estimate embraces all government programs of economic assistance-
bilateral and multilateral. The United States accounts for most of the
two-billion-dollar figure, largely through "defense support" aid to countries
with which it has military assistance agreements-Nationalist China,
South Korea, South Vietnam, Pakistan, and Turkey. Only about 400
million dollars of United States aid have been available each year for the
uncommitted countries of Asia and Africa. The public aid programs of the
other Western countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East amount to
another 200-300 million dollars, and once again this is concentrated in
their overseas commonwealths.
When we add the total of 600-700 million dollars in public assistance
a The figures cited above are the author's estimates based on analysis of the United
States Office of Business Economics, Dep't of Commerce periodical, Survey of CurrentBusiness, and The International Flow of Private Capital 1956-1958, U.N. Doc. No. E/3249(1959). The lack of data on capital movements in many countries and the incomparability
of much of the data that is available make it necessary to emphasize that the figures given
above are only rough estimates.
4 U.N. Economic and Social Council Off. Rec., 24th Sess., Annexes, Agenda ItemNo. 6, at 24 (Doc. No. E/3047) (1957).
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to the approximately 750 million dollars of private investment, we get a
total annual capital flow of something under one and one-half billion
dollars to the uncommitted, non-oil-producing, underdeveloped areas of
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. This volume of capital flow to areas
containing nearly one billion of the world's people amounts to about $1.50
per capita and is clearly inadequate to support the rate of growth essential
to the achievement of our basic objectives.
4. The existing flow of investment to the underdeveloped countries will
not be materially increased by attempts to draft an intergovernmental code
for the protection of private foreign investment.
In the early postwar years the United States government took the
view that the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral treaties could
provide a great stimulus to private foreign investment in underdeveloped
countries. Thanks to recent experience, this view is not widely held in
Washington today. But some lawyers and businessmen in the United States
and Europe have recently revived the idea of drafting a multilateral
investment code.5
In essence, the proposed investment code would declare that a govern-
ment may not legally take the property of aliens except for a public pur-
pose and then only upon payment of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation. It would state that any taking of alien property not in
accordance with these requirements is a violation of international law and,
therefore, ineffective to pass title, so that the courts of other states would
not recognize the title of the taking government in the event that the
property found its way into their jurisdiction. Prompt compensation would
be defined to mean the payment of compensation at the time of the taking
or, at least, provision at the time of taking for the payment of compensa-
tion within a reasonable time thereafter; adequate compensation would be
defined to mean the fair market value of the taken property (taking into
account, in appropriate circumstances, the factor of loss of profit); and
effective compensation would be defined to mean payment in the investor's
currency or in a currency convertible into the investor's currency.
Quite apart from the question of whether all the principles summarized
above can be said to represent international law as it now exists," there
' The most important efforts'have been led by groups under the direction of Hermann
Abs of Germany and Lord Shawcross of the United Kingdom. The summary which follows
is based on the recent Draft Convention on Investments Abroad which appears to be thejoint work of these groups. For more details on the Abs and Shawcross efforts, see Miller
Protection of Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral Convention, 53 Am. J. Int. L. 371
(1959), and Brandon, An International Investment Code: Current Plans, J. Business L. 7(Jan., 1959).
o The Preamble of the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad contains language
suggesting that the Convention is a "restatement of principles." In several important respects
it is clearly a good deal more than that. International law in its present state of develop-
ment, for example, does not require that compensation for lawfully expropriated property
be made in transferable form. Reference in the Comment to the Convention (p. 122) to
the case of the S. S. Wimbledon, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 1 (1923) is not in point. That
case involved a distinctly different question-the currency in which to pay damages for an
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is surely very little hope of achieving agreement between underdeveloped
and the industrially advanced countries on a code embodying such prin-
ciples. There are at least four reasons for pessimism on this score.
In the first place, it is doubtful whether the industrialized countries
themselves would be willing to accept all these propositions. Look, for
example, at the bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation
which the United States has concluded with Germany and Japan. The
German treaty provides for payment of "just" compensation. 7 Apparently,
under the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany, just compensa-
tion takes into account the German public interest and may be compen-
sation considerably below the actual value of expropriated property.8
Neither the German nor the Japanese treaty contains an unqualified com-
mitment to pay compensation transferable into the investor's currency.
The German treaty specifies only "reasonable" facilities for transfer of
compensation, 9 while the Japanese treaty specifies "reasonable" transfer
of compensation subject to whatever exchange controls may be neces-
sary to assure imports of goods and services essential to the welfare of
the Japanese people.' 0 It is unlikely that Germany and Japan would be
willing to sign a multilateral code of the kind suggested earlier contain-
ing commitments they were not prepared to accept in the bilateral treaties.
The same is true of other industrial countries--even Canada, which was not
prepared to accept such broad commitments when the charter of the In-
ternational Trade Organization (ITO) was being drafted in 1946-1948
and would probably be even less willing to accept them today.
In the second place, whatever may be the prospect of achieving agree-
ment on the above principles between the industrialized countries, there
is surely little prospect of achieving agreement with the underdeveloped
countries. The United States today has commercial investment-protection
international wrong. It is one thing to say that Germany must pay in francs for wrongful
refusal of passage through the Kiel Canal which causes damages to a French company;
it is quite another to say that Germany must pay francs upon taking the property of a
French company or citizen located within German territory, particularly where such prop-
erty may be the product of reinvested mark earnings and where the corporation or person
is a permanent resident of Germany and has the opportunity to reinvest marks within
the country.
This is not to say that transferability should not be required as a matter of policy,
but only that different issues are at stake here and should be examined separately from
the issues involved in cases of the Wimbledon type. It should be recalled also that restric-
tions on the transfer of compensation for expropriated property can be justified under
Arts. VI and XIV of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.(Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, T.I.A.S. No.
1501.) As the following paragraph in the text points out, such restrictions in circumstances
of exchange stringency are specifically permitted even in those United States bilateral
treaties most favorable to investors.
7 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States of
America and the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. V(4), Oct. 29, 1954, T.IA.S.
No. 3593.
8 Rubin, Private Foreign Investment: Legal and Economic Realities 17, 77 (1956).
9 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States of
America and the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 7, at Art. XH(4).
10 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States of
America and Japan, Art. XI(3), April 2, 1953, T.ILA.S. No. 2863.
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treaties in effect (even with all their watered-down commitments) with
only five countries in the "underdeveloped" category-Nicaragua, Taiwan,
Ethiopia, Israel, and Iran. We have been unable to obtain the signature on
such a treaty of any newly independent nation of Asia or Africa or any
Arab state. Although we did succeed in negotiating such a treaty with
Uruguay, it is not yet in effect, which means there is not even an invest-
ment-protection treaty in force with a country of South America. This
experience gives us little reason to be optimistic about associating the
principal underdeveloped countries of the non-Communist world in a
multilateral investment code containing the strict investment-protection
provisions summarized above.
In the third place, we do not even have to speculate about the possibility
of drafting a successful multilateral investment treaty. Two attempts have
already been made in the postwar period, both of them disastrous. In
the case of the Bogota Agreement among the American states, the pro-
visions of the agreement, already somewhat inadequate from the private
investor's point of view, were rendered completely meaningless by reserva-
tions attached to the agreement by various Latin American countries sub-
ordinating the provisions of the treaty to their national laws. In the case
of the ITO charter, the lengthy bargaining at Geneva and Havana resulted
in the lowest common denominator of agreement, and the final provisions
did more to affirm the right of underdeveloped countries to interfere with
investments than the rights of the investors themselves. The unsatisfactory
investment provisions were a principal reason for the failure of the charter
to receive the endorsement of the major interested American business
groups or the approval of the United States Congress.
If a conference of the free-world countries were held tomorrow to draft
a multilateral investment treaty, would the result be any better? It is true
that the last decade has brought a somewhat greater appreciation of the
importance of private investment among leaders in some European and
even in some underdeveloped countries; but there have also emerged a
number of new independent underdeveloped countries. These and the
other underdeveloped nations freed from colonial rule or Western influ-
ence after the Second World War are highly nationalistic. Political leaders
in most of these countries would be keenly embarrassed if they were
obliged to register public acceptance of the investment code described
earlier, however much they might be privately sympathetic with its princi-
ples. Unexceptionable as it may seem to us, such a code is too easily as-
sociated with capitulations, colonialism, and the abuses of native capitalists
and landlords. For this reason, it would be unwise to force another public,
intergovernmental showdown on investment questions-particularly a
showdown concerned with general principles rather than concrete prob-
lems. The underdeveloped countries would only insist, as they have in
United Nations debates, on recognition of their sovereignty over their
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natural resources, and on the need to qualify private property rights by
public interests of an economic and social nature. The industrialized coun-
tries, or some of them, would espouse the proposed investment-protection
principles summarized above. The final document would embody some-
thing of the slogans of both sides, with the result that it would be satis-
factory to neither. The public confrontation of opposing doctrines would
leave a legacy of bitterness. The only gainers would be the Communists."
Recently an alternative suggestion has been made that the members
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation should them-
selves draft a treaty on this subject which might then be open for adher-
ence by underdeveloped countries. Although the provisions of such a
treaty would be more satisfactory from the point of view of private in-
vestors than the provisions of a treaty negotiated with underdeveloped
countries, it is doubtful that such a treaty would go quite as far toward
investor protection as the proposed code summarized earlier. Futhermore,
adherence to a treaty negotiated among the former colonial powers of
Western Europe would hardly commend itself to the leaders of the under-
developed countries. The whole idea would look suspiciously like some
form of collective imperialism.
One final problem with the proposal for a multilateral investment treaty
is the impossibility of achieving a definition of a taking of private property
broad enough to be of substantial practical value. Property rights can be
effectively destroyed in many ways short of an actual confiscation or ex-
propriation-they can be taken indirectly by exchange controls, export and
import regulation, taxation, labor legislation, limitations on the ownership
and control of enterprises, price controls, even by runaway inflation. Indeed,
the prospect of these indirect takings provides much more of a deterrent
to private foreign investment in underdeveloped countries than the pros-
pect of a direct taking via confiscation or expropriation. No international
agreement can satisfactorily protect against all these indirect forms of
taking-certainly no agreement to which an underdeveloped country would
willingly subscribe. In the last analysis, foreign investors place primary
emphasis on a satisfactory "investment climate," a phrase used to describe
a whole constellation of government policies and conditions which affect
the security of investment and profit opportunities. This satisfactory invest-
ment climate is not somethng which can be created by drafting an invest-
ment code.12
11 Even between countries which share as much of a consensus as the United States
and Britain, premature attempts to draft detailed principles of international economic
conduct have proved self-defeating. See Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (1956), espe-
cially Pts. 3 and 4.
12 This point is well developed in Rubin, supra note 8.
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5. An indispensable means of stimulating the flow of private capital
to the underdeveloped countries is an expanded program of public invest-
ment.
The main deterrent to private investment in most underdeveloped coun.
tries is the very fact of their underdevelopment. BecaUse of this underde-
velopment, the United States International Development Advisory Board
has pointed out, private capital in the near future "is not likely to play a
major role in the development of either Asia or Africa." As the Board
puts it:
The immediate primary need for capital in these areas is in "social
overhead"--power, communications, transportation, and educa-
tional facilities-and it is improbable that U. S. private capital
will find this a profitable field for investment.13
If a satisfactory rate of economic growth of the underdeveloped countries
is to be achieved, it is clear that an increased program of public invest-
ment in social overhead will have to pave the way.
For nearly a decade, the question of establishing a new international
agency to provide public capital for economic development was debated
in the United Nations in connection with the proposed Special United Na.
tions Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The United States
took the position in these debates that such an ambitious program of
economic development should be deferred until such time as the countries
of the world could reduce their arms burdens as part of a plan of enforced
disarmament. Privately, our government expressed reluctance to put
large amounts of American money in an institution likely to be dominated
by the recipients of aid. It also feared the prospect of Communist-bloc
participation in any such United Nations sponsored arrangement.
The long stalemate on this subject came to an end in 1958. Attention
was dramatically shifted to a stage outside the United Nations when
Senator A. S. Mike Monroney made his proposal for an International De-
velopment Association (IDA) to be operated as an affiliate of the World
Bank.14 From the point of view of the United States, the Monroney pro-
posal would avoid the difficulties of the SUNFED plan by placing develop.
ment funds in the hands of a responsible financial institution in which the
United States and its industrial allies have voting control and in which
Communist-bloc countries do not participate. The creation of an IDA
could greatly aid the cause of Western freedom. The problem of financing
such an institution can be solved. The IDA could start with a compara-
tively modest capital, for example, one billion dollars. The United States
could contribute about one-third of this sum and have a corresponding
amount of voting power. Provision should be made for continuous injec-
33 International Development Advisory Board, A New Emphasis on Economic Develop-
ment Abroad, A Report to the President 13 (1957).
14 S. Res. 264, 85th Cong. 2d Seas., 104 Cong. Rec. 2613 (1958).
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tions of dollar capital in succeeding years without the need for annual
congressional appropriations. One attractive solution to this problem would
be for the United States to assign to IDA the repayments due it on Mar-
shall Plan loans and other major postwar credits.
6. New measures for the protection and promotion of private invest-
ment should be combined with an expanded program of public investment
in underdeveloped countries.
The debate about methods of financing the economic development of
underdeveloped countries has been plagued too long by an argument be-
tween those who think that private investment alone should do the job
and those who think that public investment alone should do the job. In
fact, what we need is both.
The importance of private investment in foreign economic development
deserves constant emphasis. In the United States and most of the industrial
societies of the West, the bulk of capital and skills is in private hands.
Public investment, as noted earlier, must necessarily play the dominant
role in the "take-off" stage of economic development. But the burden of
financing economic development would become intolerable for the tax-
payers of Western nations if private investment were not utilized increas-
ingly as economic development gained momentum. Even in the early
stages of development, there are functions which private capital can per-
form with equal or greater success than public capital. There is no incon-
sistency, therefore, between a program of public investment in the under-
developed countries and measures to protect and promote private invest-
ment. Those who are concerned with the latter should not oppose the
former. Instead, they should consider ways in which an expanded public
investment program could be made to enlarge opportunities for private
investment.
Public and private measures for promoting economic development
should be combined in one institution. The charter of the proposed IDA
(or whatever the agency is called which is to supply additional public in-
vestment) should contain the following provisions with respect to private
investment:
First, the participating countries should agree to make maximum use
of private capital-foreign and domestic-in their economic development
efforts, so far as is consistent with their economic and social systems. This
last qualification would exempt from the obligation a country whose econ-
omy was entirely socialist. Naturally such a qualification would limit some-
what the scope of the private investment obligation. But we cannot very
well force private enterprise on countries which have entirely rejected it.
Second, the participating countries should agree to consult periodically
with the staff of the IDA on the measures they are taking to create a
favorable investment climate. The periodic consultations would be modeled
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after the system developed under Article XIV of the International Mone-
tary Fund Agreement, 15 by which Fund members maintaining exchange
controls on current transactions are obliged to consult annually about their
domestic and external financial policies. The Fund's informal consultative
machinery has done much more to achieve changes in national policies
than could possibly have been done by attempts to draft a treaty with
specific commitments about domestic and external financial policy.
Third, the charter should provide for studies on how private investment
is being used and could be used to promote the economic development of
member countries. The members would be obliged to take part in such
studies and give full publicity to their conclusions. In this way a consensus
might be slowly developed on the appropriate role of private investment
where no consensus presently exists. Many leaders of opinion in under-
developed countries still believe that there is an incompatibility between
the profit-making interest of a foreign corporation and the interest of the
country in which it operates. Numerous studies already published in the
United States (such as those of the National Planning Association on
United States business performance abroad) have amply demonstrated
that this is not the case. These studies are either not known to people in
most underdeveloped countries or are regarded by them with an under-
standable amount of skepticism. Surely it would be useful to associate
leaders from the underdeveloped countries in the conduct of studies of
a similar kind.
Fourth, the charter of the IDA should provide for the orderly settle-
ment of disputes between private investors and governments. It could
specify procedures for the mediation of such disputes by the president of
the agency, drawing on the encouraging experience in the mediation of
the controversy between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company by President
Eugene Black of the International Bank. In the event that mediation fails,
the charter should provide for the settlement of investment disputes by
members of a permanent panel of arbitrators composed of outstanding
citizens of industrial and underdeveloped countries.
Fifth, the charter could also authorize the drafting of a set of general
principles concerning private foreign investment. The investment principles
might be drafted either by the staff of the agency, by the panel of arbi-
trators, or by a group of experts chosen specially for the purpose. This set
of investment principles would differ from the proposed investment treaty
in that (a) it would not be negotiated by government representatives;
(b) it would not be formally binding upon governments; and (c) it would
specify the obligations as well as the rights of foreign investors in under-
developed countries. These three features would make the investment
principles much more palatable to the underdeveloped countries, as would
the fact that the industrial countries were committed to a long-term pro-
15 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 6.
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gram of development assistance. The principles could be used as a stand-
ard in the conduct of the periodic investment consultations and in the
arbitration of specific disputes.
Sixth, the IDA and its associated agencies (the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development [IBRD], the International Monetary
Fund, [IMF], the International Finance Corporation [IFC]) might be
obliged, in their decisions on applications for aid from underdeveloped
countries and private investors, to consider the extent to which those seek-
ing assistance were performing the various obligations outlined above. The
ultimate sanction for refusal to consult, participate in studies, and submit
disputes to mediation and arbitration in a manner found satisfactory by
the governing board of the agency would be a declaration that the country
or investor in question was ineligible to use the resources of the inter-
national lending agencies. This would be a formidable sanction in view of
the magnitude of lending operations by the IBRD, the IMF, the IFC, and
the IDA. Satisfaction of unpaid judgments rendered pursuant to arbitra-
tion might even be had out of a country's paid-in subscription.16
This is but a tentative and illustrative outline of an institution for pro-
moting and protecting private investment in underdeveloped countries.
Undoubtedly it requires substantial additions and modifications. But at
this point, it is obviously premature to argue very much over details. The
pressing need is to recognize that verbal formulas cannot camouflage the
present lack of consensus. Let us get on with the job of building a consen-
sus over the years through institutions in which men of good will can
work together in the common interest.
'0 The proposals in this paragraph would, of course, require amendments to the
Articles of Agreement of the IMF, IBRD, and IFC.
